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Abstract
Purpose – How do different corporate governance structures fare under conditions of fundamental
environmental transformations? Treating governance structure as a knowledge distribution
mechanism embedded in institutional frameworks, the paper aims to propose that the efficiency of
this knowledge diffusing process will increase organizational survival under a punctuational change.
Design/methodology/approach – Using the case of Chinese banking industry during 1897-1927,
a period of rapid technological, economic, and regulatory shifts.
Findings – Money shops (qianzhuang) with decentralized, open and extended governance structure
were better able to adapt to rapid changes in the environment and had a higher survival chance than
ticket stores (piaohao) with centralized, closed and internalized governance structure.
Research limitations/implications – When exogenous shocks dramatically change the
environment, decentralized, open and extended governance structures can more easily discover new
habitats in which a modified form of organization can thrive.
Originality/value – By examining the Chinese banking industry during the fundamental shift of the
environment at the turn of the twentieth century, this paper sheds new wisdom on the understanding
of the current turbulent world and helps us discover new solutions to cope with the institutional
transition necessary to survive and prosper in the new world environment and pave the road ahead.
Keywords China, Governance, Banking, Organizational survival
Paper type Research paper

Introduction
All history is contemporary history (Benedetto Croce, 1921).
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The recent world financial system meltdown and Asian financial crisis in the late 1990s all
reveal the importance of sound corporate governance practices in the banking industry.
Since Berle and Means (1932), the Anglo-American discourse on corporate governance with
the separation of ownership and control has dominated the literature. However,
La Porta et al. (1999) find that except in economies with very good shareholder protection,
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relatively few firms in the 27 wealthy economies fit this widely-held image of modern
corporations. Rather, the majority of the firms are controlled by either families or the state.
In light of Williamson’s (1999, p. 1101) view that “adaptation is the central problem of
economic organization” and that “governance structures are predominantly instruments
for adaptation”, the diversity of corporate governance structures raises interesting
questions regarding how they enable organizations to cope with environmental changes
(Aoki and Jackson, 2008). Particularly relevant for today’s world is how organizations
equipped with different governance structures fare under radical and sudden
transformations such as capping executive compensation in the US and EURO
Governments’ bailout plan of 2008, the tightened regulation by the 2002 Sarbanes-Oxley
Act in the post-Enron era, and the “institutional void” in post-socialist transition economies.
What can we learn from the death of investment bank in unlimited leverage,
off-balance-sheet financing with their greedy executives? Business history always
enlightens us with valuable lessons for exploring the inherent linkage between corporate
governance and organizational survival in today’s riotous environments. This paper
begins with the premise that the origin of corporate governance is embedded in
historically shaped institutions that define “the rule of game” (North, 1990, p. 3) among
the owners, investors, managers, and the state (Morgan, 2006). When these formal or
informal institutions are disrupted, some previously dominant organization mode may
not be able to adapt more efficiently than others, resulting in differential survival rates
among competing governance structures. We examine this argument in the case of
China’s burgeoning banking industry from 1897 to 1927, a period when today’s concept
of corporate governance was only emerging.
Literature review: punctuational change
Traditional approaches to organizational survival have been dominated by the template,
routine, and order under gradual restructuring of environmental conditions (Eisenhardt
and Martin, 2000; Tsoukas and Chia, 2002). However, today’s business always faces the
challenge of uncertainty and volatility with occurrences of punctuational changes, and
organizations often face the risk of extinction as the result of some sudden change, such
as disruptive technology, social turmoil, financial market meltdown, consumer boycott,
investor activism, sudden regulation shifts, and international market shock. Hence,
being able to adapt successfully under radical environmental transformations, or
punctuational changes (Haveman, 1992; Haveman et al., 2001), has become a critical
challenge for organizations in an uncertain and complex business environment.
Punctuational changes originated from the paleontological concept of punctuated
equilibria (Gould and Eldredge, 1977). Different from the theory of phyletic gradualism,
which hypothesizes that most evolutions occur through steady and gradual
transformation of whole lineages, the notion of punctuational equilibria states that
most species will show little response to evolutionary change throughout their
histories. When evolution does happen, punctuational change occurs relatively quickly
in comparison to the species’ full duration on earth. Recently, scientists found that
punctuational change may play a more important role in promoting evolutionary
divergence than has previously been appreciated (Pagel et al., 2006).
In the organizational literature, the punctuated equilibrium model of change
recognizes that long periods of small, incremental technological or organizational
change are interrupted by brief periods of radical technological or organizational change
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that fundamentally changes an organization or industry (Abernathy and Utterback,
1978; Tushman and Anderson, 1986). Fundamental breakthroughs such as DNA
cloning, the automobile, the airplane, and photocopying are examples of radical
technological innovation. The punctuated equilibrium model find that organizations
and technologies exhibit long periods of stability and short bursts of radical change due
to radical shifts in the environment (Tushman and Anderson, 1986; Romanelli and
Tushman, 1994; Utterback, 1994). Carroll (1987, p. 2007) proposes that “exogenous
punctuational change is probably more important, pervasive, and frequent than has
been acknowledged by economists or organizational analysts.” In this paper, we
investigate how governance structures embedded in preexisting tasks and institutional
environments react to and diverge under punctuational changes.
Agency theory treats the firm as an institutional device through which
decision-making rights are assigned to motivate agents (Fama, 1980; Fama and
Jensen, 1983; Jensen and Meckling, 1976). This theory emphasizes how to protect
investors from the separation of the ownership and control in the Anglo-American
model. However, family business and state-owned enterprises are more prevalent in
other countries around the world (La Porta et al., 1999; Morgan, 2006). In another line,
transaction cost economics views the firm in organizational terms as a governance
structure with its main attributes being incentive and control mechanism (Williamson,
1999). In application, both the transaction cost and agency approaches deal with relative
bureaucratic/control costs among alternative governance structures, making optimal
efficiency a rather remote benchmark for organizational survival and success. In light of
the criticism that transaction cost, based on equilibrium contracting setup, is a static
approach (Langlois, 1992), it is difficult to predict which governance structure confers
the best chance of survival when the environment undergoes punctuational change.
Other literature on organization change can be found in the ecological theory.
Hannan and Freeman (1984) suggest that organizational survival is often hard to
achieve because institutionalized routines create strong internal resistance and that
change can be detrimental to organizational performance. Granovetter (1985) similarly
proposes that organizational survival is not easy because organization adaption is
difficult for its deep embeddedness within institution and network environment.
Tsoukas and Chia (2002) further treat change as a normal condition for organizational
survival and argue that in today’s increasingly turbulent environment, organizations
must adapt to change openly and maintain high performance consistently.
The utility of ecological theory lies partly in providing a form of “ultimate test” of
organizational effectiveness. That is, for a given governance structure, a high survival
rate can be considered as a positive indication of effectiveness, while a high mortality
rate represents a negative one. The ecological theory’s natural-selection model thus
entails a historical perspective that other approaches cannot provide. In this paper, we
seek to advance the literature by developing a more dynamic theory of how modes of
corporate governance influence the chance of survival for organizations under
punctuational environmental transformations.
Theoretical framework: corporate governance as a knowledge distribution
mechanism
Corporate governance involves a complex set of relationships between the managers,
directors, shareholders, and other stakeholders. While orthodox economics views the

firm as merely an allocation device, an alternative conceptualization can be traced to
Hayek’s (1945, p. 519) insight that:
[. . .] the economic problem of society is thus not merely a problem of how to allocate “given”
resources – if “given” is taken to mean given to a single mind which deliberately solves the
problem set by these “data.” It is rather a problem of how to secure the best use of resources
known to any of the members of society, for ends whose relative importance only these
individuals know. Or, to put it briefly, it is a problem of the utilization of knowledge which is
not given to anyone in its totality.

Hayek’s insight provides a foundation for analyzing the implications of knowledge
distribution not only in a society, but also within organizations.
Firms under different governance structures represent systems with different
patterns of knowledge distribution (Tsoukas, 1996), and how knowledge is produced,
used, and transformed inside organizations plays important roles in shaping their
effectiveness and in particular their capability of adapting to environmental changes.
To track knowledge distribution inside organizations, we first classify two types of
knowledge:
(1) tacit knowledge (Polanyi, 1998) which is costly to transfer among agents, also
called soft information (Petersen, 2004) in finance literature; and
(2) explicit knowledge which is easily transferable, also called hard information
(Petersen, 2004).
Although tacit knowledge is difficult to teach, to be stored in mass media, or to be learned
(Polanyi, 1998), it is one of the most critical resources for innovation and building
sustainable competitive advantage (Nonaka, 1991). In the long run, some critical tacit
knowledge will be shared, articulated, and codified into explicit knowledge (e.g. formal
documentations communicated via formal channels, budgeting from the headquarters,
job descriptions prepared by the human resources department, and annual report to
residual claimants), which in turn changes the decision-making structure.
Yet not all tacit knowledge can be transferred into explicit knowledge because of
huge cost involved in the transfer. Jensen and Meckling (1995) argued that:
[. . .] the question is not whether knowledge can be transferred, but at what cost it can be
transferred, and whether it is worth it to do so. Transfers yield benefits when the additional
knowledge enables the decision-maker to make better choices.

Therefore, only if a specific governance structure can effectually and efficiently
facilitate the transfer and diffusion of knowledge, can it improve organizational
decision making and the adaptability to a changing environment.
The banking literature shows the importance of “soft information” in the bank
financing to attenuate asymmetric information problems (Berger and Udell, 1995;
Stein, 2002). Some banks (like community banks in microfinance service) specialize in a
loan service based on soft information (personal relations) while others (like national
banks) specialize in a loan service based on hard information (Petersen, 2004; Sun et al.,
2013). The larger and more hierarchical banks, where the decision maker is further
from the information collector, are more reliant on hard information (Stein, 2002). The
information efficiency in the banking sector is a critical way to ensure its operation as
financial intermediary and thus determine its scale economies. The change of
technology and environment redefines bank’s operations based on these two kinds of
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information (soft and hard), and their associated generation and maintenance costs,
and the global banking industry as we witness has been going through waves of
consolidation processes impacted by the information technologies during the last
decade (Boot and Marinc, 2008).
As March (1991, p. 85) has pointed out, “learning, analysis, imitation, regeneration,
and technological change are major components of any effort to improve organizational
performance and strengthen competitive advantage”. When the environment changes,
organizations will respond by attempting to reshape individuals’ beliefs and habits of
action. Insofar as such adaptation is an ongoing process, knowledge distribution
mechanisms entailed by different governance structures can lead to different
information transfer costs, learning speeds, innovation opportunities, and ultimately
different survival rates. Following this general logic, we argue that the following three
attributes or dimensions of corporate governance could affect the knowledge
distribution under punctuational changes.
Centralization vs decentralization
Hayek (1945) proposes that the decentralization of knowledge in society could improve
decision-making quality and then improve the opportunity of organizational survival
and entrepreneurship. Fama and Jensen (1983) categorize two types of organizations and
their different needs to centralize or decentralize decision making. On the one hand,
small noncomplex organizations such as sole proprietorships, and some partnerships
and family companies are suited to centralization of decision making and can reap
efficiency gains when the rights to manage and control decisions are combined in one or
a few residual claimants. However, as organizations become more complex, such as in
the case of public corporations and large professional partnerships, specific knowledge
tends to be diffused in the organizations. Thus, in large complex organizations, benefits
from better decisions can be achieved by delegating and decentralizing decision
functions to agents at all levels of the organization that have the relevant specific
knowledge, rather than allocating all decision management and control to the residual
claimants. Jensen and Meckling (1995) develop a trade-off model to explain how the
distribution of knowledge impacts the agency cost and optimal location of decision right.
Specifically, in delegating authority to maximize organizational survival, the CEO
wants to partition the decisions out among agents in the organization in a way to
maximize their aggregate value. There are two types of cost involved, the cost of
bad decisions owing to poor information and the cost owing to inconsistency among
decisions. How these two types of cost balance out determines the optimal level of
decentralization (Figure 1(a) and (b)).
In Figure 1(a), curve B represents the cost of making bad decisions, and the more
centralized, the higher the probability is of making a bad decision based on lack of
knowledge of the specific situation and thus the higher the cost. Curve I represents the
cost of making inconsistent decisions, and the more decentralized, the higher the
probability is of making inconsistent decisions and thus the higher the cost. Under
conditions of punctuational change, the cost of bad decisions owing to poor
information will be higher than that under the gradual change because a seemingly
small mistake in a fast changing environment could result in missing a major window
of opportunity. Therefore, punctuational changes will shift the curve for the cost of bad
decisions owing to poor information upward from B to B0 in Figure 1(b). Similarly, at the

Corporate
governance

T
Total Organizational costs
Y: Cost from
decision
making

I

O

273
Costs owing to
inconsistent objectives

CEO’s
Office

B
Costs owing to poor
information

Optimal location of
decision right

Point at which decision
rights is located

X: Distance of
decision right from
CEO’s office

(a)

Total Organizational costs

O’

T’

I’

Y: Cost from
decision
making
Costs owing to
inconsistent objectives

CEO’s
Office

B’

Costs owing to poor
information

Optimal location of Point at which decision
decision right
rights is located
(b)

X: Distance of
decision right from
CEO’s office

Source: Inspired from Jensen and Meckling (1995)

same time, the cost of making inconsistent decisions will also go up in a punctuational
change, shifting the curve for the cost of inconsistent decisions upward from I in
Figure 1(a) to I0 in Figure 1(b). These two combined will make the curve of total
organizational cost go up as well, from T to T0 . The optimal location of decision right
(O) in Figure 1(a) then reaches a new equilibrium point at O0 in Figure 1(b).
Since the environment changes radically in a punctuational change, the
overwhelming concern is to change rapidly to adapt to the shifting environment. At
a time like this, it is much more costly to miss the changes in the environment than to
have some inefficiency or inconsistency in decisions. Thus, the increase in cost of bad
decisions from B to B0 is much higher than the increase in cost of inconsistent decisions
from I to I0 . This leads to the new optimal point of decision right O0 being located to the
right of the original equilibrium of O, representing a more decentralized structure than
in the original case. In other words, decentralized corporate governance structures tend

Figure 1.
(a) Completely centralized
organization in decision
making and (b) completely
decentralized organization
in decision making

NBRI
4,4

to be better aligned with a radically changing environment and therefore should confer
higher chances of survival. This dynamic model leads to the following proposition:
P1.

274

Under punctuational change, organizations equipped with decentralized
governance structures have a higher chance of survival than those equipped
with centralized governance structures.

Closedness vs openness
From a knowledge distribution point of view, the openness vis-à-vis closedness of
organizational decision making is not only defined by the incentives of the decision
agents, but also how broadly information will be collected and how concerns from
external parties will be processed. The awareness of alternative governance structure
depends in part on how the organization interacts with its environment (Levinthal and
March, 1993). Openness is an important mentality which enhances
organization-environment interactions and promotes the acquisition of new
knowledge. Organizations with an open orientation tend to pay closer attention to
their external stakeholders and also watch their competitors more carefully (Sun et al.,
2013). An open orientation thus enables organizations, such as Google’s Android or
microloan institutions, to find a variety of new ways and ideas on how to better serve
their stakeholders (Sun et al., 2013). Governance structures with open orientations can
facilitate the discovery and occupation of emerging niches.
Furthermore, organizations with an open orientation also like to monitor their
competitors carefully and to learn from them fast. This in turn gives the organization
innovative ideas to understand industry evolution and improve internal administration
(Porter, 1987; Sun et al., 2010). Using its rivals as a benchmark, an organization can
reexamine its structures and practices and reconfigure them to enhance
competitiveness. Therefore, we predict that:
P2.

Under a punctuational change, organizations equipped with open orientations
have a higher chance of survival than those equipped with closed orientations.

Internalized vs extended networks
Economic actions are embedded in networks and institutions (Granovetter, 1985). As a
result, the performance of a corporate governance structure depends on the
organization’s network relations with its customers, partners, suppliers, competitors,
and shareholders. These network connections can serve not only as opportunities but
also as constraints. The quality and structure of these connections shape economic
actions by creating unique opportunities (Sun and Lee, 2013; Uzzi, 1996).
Previous studies in governance have largely classified its forms into two systems:
outsider system and insider system (Berglof, 1997; Morgan, 2006). Respectively, we
rename them internalized network and extended network to link to the literature of
network theory. The formal governance structure based on extended network is the
outsider or market-dominated model, which is most commonly found in
Anglo-American economies and has served as the empirical basis for mainstream
theories of corporate governance (such as agency theory). The latter governance
structure, based on internalized network, is the insider-dominated model, which is
common in Asian family businesses and state-owned enterprises. There are distinctive
attributions among these models with regard to ownership, control, stakeholders, and

capital markets. In order to determine the different survivor rate under conditions of
punctuational change, we use the exploration-exploitation framework developed by
March (1991).
The governance structure based on internalized network exhibits high levels of
ownership concentration and limited right protection of minority shareholder interest.
It is easy for organization on exploitation, like in terms of refinement, production, and
implementation (March, 1991), and in distribution of inside knowledge efficiently.
However, under punctuational changes, it is difficult for this mode of governance
structure to adapt to new environmental conditions or to acquire new resources to
support their existence and development.
In contrast, the governance structures based on extended network exhibit widely
dispersed shareholders, highly liquid stock markets, and an active M&A market for
corporate control (e.g. the UK and the USA). It makes it easier for organizations to engage
in exploration activities, which is associated with terms like search, variation, risk
taking, experimentation, discovery and innovation (March, 1991) and in distribution of
outside knowledge efficiently. Although the returns of exploration in extended network
are uncertain, distant and often negative, the essence of exploration is experimentation
with new alternatives. Thus, under conditions of punctuational change:
[. . .] the distance in time and space between the locus of learning and the locus for the
realization of returns is generally greater in the case of exploration than in the case of
exploitation (March, 1991, p. 85).

It is easier for the governance structure based on extended network to find new
resource and adjust in a new environment than for the governance structure based on
internalized network. We suggest:
P3.

Under a punctuational change, organizations with extended network have a
higher chance of survival than those with internalized network.

There is a positive correlation between these dimensions of knowledge distribution
system: centralization vs decentralization, closedness vs openness, and internalized vs
extended networks. Generally, decentralized organizations also tend to be more open and
have more extended networks, while centralized organizations tend to be more closed and
have more internalized networks. Of these three dimensions, we think the centralization
vs decentralization dimension is probably the most important, because it is a basic
organizational structure attribute that affects the organizational mentality of openness
vs closedness, and that mentality further affects whether the organization pays more
attention to its external environment and networks or its internal system and networks.
The interactions of these three dimensions of knowledge distribution are shown in
Figure 2. The X-axis catches the attribute of centralization vs decentralization; the Y-axis
catches the attribute of closedness vs openness; and the Z-axis catches the attribute of
internalized vs extended networks. Companies tend to occupy the corners of this
three-dimensional structure. Some examples could be found from the current technology
industry. For example, under the “cathedral” model, Microsoft’s R&D mode and its
knowledge distribution system with its partners are likely to located in centralization,
closedness, and internalized networks. In comparison, under the open source “bazaar”
model, Google’s Android created an R&D platform with decentralization, openness, and
extended networks attributes (Baldwin and Clark, 2006). Apple’s governance mode
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Figure 2.
Three dimensions of
knowledge distribution
in governance

with its partners is in the middle of Microsoft and Google, but more closed to the space of
centralization, closedness, and internalized networks with great control through iTunes.
However, China’s Shanzhai mode in the mobile phone industry is more located in the
space of decentralization, openness, and extended networks. This governance mode
helps Chinese small- and medium-sized mobile phone companies access the knowledge
and resources distributed among global value chains and collaborated network, and
enables them to quickly respond to changing global market demands, break away the
control of big multinational companies’ dominance and monopoly in technology and
market, and respond rapidly to new technology and environment punctuational changes
(Sun et al., 2010; Zhu and Shi, 2010).
Method and analysis
Recurring critiques made by scholars in organization studies generally emphasize the
need for process-oriented research as a critical future agenda (Aldrich, 2001; Hernes,
1976; Langley, 1999; Van de Ven and Poole, 1995; Weick, 1999). Qualitative and
comparative case study method provides a proper tool for addressing the process as a
sequence of events that take place over time. Mosakowski and Earley (2000) assert that
a thoughtful treatment of the role of time is central in process theorizing and research,
and Salk and Khoury (2006) propose “to explain change phenomena in terms of
examining the sequencing of events, actions and activities over time and, in many
cases, across levels of analysis” and “tell a narrative story about how a sequence of
events unfolds to produce a given outcome” (Van de Ven and Engleman, 2004, p. 347).
Following this process-oriented research method, we focus on China’s burgeoning
banking industry in the 1897-1927 period to examine how technological, economic, and
institutional shifts compelled two different types of banking organizations onto
diverging paths.

Research setting: China’s burgeoning banking industry (1897-1927)
In the middle of the Qing Dynasty (1644-1911), Chinese financial institutions were
already conducting all major banking functions, including the absorption of deposits,
making loans, issuing notes, money exchange, and long distance remittance
transfers[1]. Toward the end of the Qing Dynasty and during the early years of the
Republic of China (1911-1949), China’s banking business reached a new high with
ticket stores (piaohao), money shops (qianzhuang), and foreign banks competing
against each other at a time of accelerating process of commercialization (Figure 3).
The banking industry is not only capital-intensive, but also knowledge-intensive.
This makes it an ideal setting for examining our arguments that conceptualize
organizations as systems of knowledge distribution (Hayek, 1945; Tsoukas, 1996).
Similar to the California savings and loan associations in the 1980s (Haveman, 1992),
China’s burgeoning banking had experienced major punctuational changes in
technological, economic, and regulatory shifts that had forced ticket stores and money
shops to either change or die (Cheng, 2003).
Technological shifts. During the early nineteenth century, the Chinese society was
exposed to many new technologies imported from Western countries. For the banking
industry, the largest impact came from telegraphy. For the first time, people were able
to exchange information between distant locations in real time on a regular basis. By
the mid-1870s telegraphy services were typically provided by post offices. In addition,
the development of a transportation infrastructure such as railway and steamboat
dramatically changed the business landscape in China.
Economic shifts. In the early 1900s, China encountered the first wave of
globalization. For example, Shanghai’s export and import trade jumped from almost
zero in the early 1840s to 381 million taels of silver in 1895, which accounted for
52 percent of China’s total foreign trade value. Increasing international trade not only
benefited local financial institutions, but also attracted many foreign banks to enter the
Chinese market. The British Orient Bank was the first foreign bank set up in China in
1845 (Cheng, 2003). After the Qing Dynasty lost the Opium War in 1860, many Western
banks launched businesses in China when a number of Chinese coastal cities were
forced to open to foreign trade. The Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corporation
(today known as HSBC) was established in 1865 in Hong Kong, and later became the
largest foreign bank in China. In the next decades, foreign banks established hubs in
Shanghai and operated in more than 30 Chinese cities.
Foreign banks, by virtue of their extraterritorial rights, were not restricted by any
regulations of the Chinese Government. Not only did these banks completely control
China’s international remittance and foreign trade financing, they also enjoyed the
Foreign Banks,
32%
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freedom of running other banking businesses in China. Local Chinese financial
institutions faced fierce competition from these foreign banks.
At the turn of the twentieth century, the so-called “new-style” domestic entrepreneurs
(“xinshi shanren”) started to invest in emerging industries such as harbor, match,
cement, wool spinning, coal mining, enamel, banking, and insurance (Chung). These
modern businesses were mostly invested through the Western corporate forms and less
likely be confined by the traditional guild-based networks. Those modern corporate
forms brought new kind of ownership and property right to the Chinese entrepreneur
(Chung, 2000).
Regulatory shifts. The modern banking industry relies on the state to establish and
enforce the law to protect the property rights and reduce the transaction cost. However,
the Qing Dynasty was weak in constructing the law to safeguard the security of their
loans. Before the Qing government introduced its first company law in 1903 and first
made the modern firms possible, Chinese bankers were free to govern themselves,
utilize contracts, and shape their industry. Most banking organizations use informal
institutions to regulate and organize multiple geographic branches. This freedom came
with a high price, and ultimately the bankers suffered from the absence of a legislative
forum to sanction and codify business practices. In October 1911, the Republican
Revolution broke out in China. The revolution soon eliminated China’s last dynasty as
well as its more than 2,000-year-long monarchy system. The Republic of China, headed
by Sun Yat-sen, was born in 1912, opening a new era of Chinese history.
Although the political instability of the early nineteenth century resulted in a
turbulent environment for Chinese firms and banks, the first modern Chinese bank, the
Imperial Bank of China (IBC), opened for business in Shanghai on May 27, 1897. Many
new banks and financial institutions followed it and enhanced their strengths by
providing new services, exploring new markets, finding new resources, introducing
new methods in management, and creating new organizations. It turned out to be a
golden era for entrepreneurs.
The warlord government period (1912-1927) promulgated a series of regulations,
such as the rules of seven banks of China (1913-1915), the Securities and Stock
Exchange Law (1914), the Charters of Inspecting Bank (1916), and the Constitution of
Banking Consortia (1918). These legal documents regulated the banking industry and
gave modern banks institutional legitimacy. When a united nationalist government
took power in Nanjing in 1927, it announced the first “Banking Law” in 1931. The
“Golden Age” of Chinese capitalism began.
Punctuational change usually experiences the environmental restructure (Gould and
Eldredge, 1977). We believe that the period from 1897 (the creation of the first modern
Chinese bank) to 1927 (country reunited and new national government started to
operate) in China fits the concept of punctuational change in which bursts of evolution
associated with speciation after evolutionary divergence among species is
characterized by long periods of stability or stasis.
Ticket stores
Origin, operation, and organization. Ticket stores were often called Shanxi piaohao in
Chinese, or Shanxi banks, because the natives of Shanxi Province owned most of these
banks. The first ticket store originated from the Xiyuecheng Dye Company (Cheng,
2003; Zhang et al., 2006). The Dye Company grew fast and set up several branches

around the country, and even had an outlet in Beijing Chongwen street, over 1,000 miles
away from its headquarters in Pingyao District of Shanxi Province. When trading
business grew with the circulation of large amounts of cash among different branches,
the primitive transportation system and long distance made such circulation of cash a
burden for its owner Li Da-qi, because of the extreme risk of robbery and high cost of
the employment of armed escorts. Li Da-qi hired Lei Li-tai, one of its branch managers,
to create a clever way to circulate the cash. Whenever the Dye Company needed to
transfer money from one branch in Province A to another in Province B, the branch
manager in Province A just simply issued a letter to another branch in Province B. The
new method greatly reduced the risks and costs of the shipping and handling of cash.
Lei Li-tai found that the larger the amount of circulating cash in transaction, the easier
it was to ensure that the balance of the cash flows would balance out; he therefore
quickly provided other Shanxi merchants with the same service, not only within
the Xiyuecheng Company. Lei Li-tai’s remittance business became so profitable that
the owner Li Da-qi gave up the dyeing business and injected 300,000 taels of silver as
capital into the new special remittance firm. Lei Li-tai, the first round CEO, also
contributed 20,000 taels of silver as capital. This was the start of Rishengchang, the
first ticket store, in about 1823.
As Shanxi merchants specialized in trans-regional, long-distance trade, their cost on
shipping of silver bullion increased. An armed convoy of silver usually cost 2-3 percent
of its value. The remittance business of the ticket store became their convenient
payment method in inter-city and inter-regional silver tael exchange because the ticket
store charged only three-tenths of 1 percent for checks. The trust within the Shanxi
merchant community built the reputation of the ticket store, and attracted more clients.
The ticket store increased its scale and made cash payment more effective and safe. In
the next 30 years, 11 ticket stores were built in Shanxi Province.
Despite their international reach to Japan, Korea, and Russia (Hamashita, 1999), all
Shanxi ticket store branches were administered under a centralized system with head
offices in the three districts in Shanxi Province: Qixian, Taigu, and Pingyao
(Zhang, 1998). A remote city, Pingyao, became the financial hub of a nationwide money
remittance. The general managers in these headquarters directed the branches all over
the country. By the end of the nineteenth century, 32 ticket stores operated
475 branches, covering 35 cities in 18 provinces in China and expanding to Southeast
Asia and Japan (Wikipedia.com). The rapid growth of ticket stores suggests that this
centralized governance structure was very efficient under a stable environment
(Figure 4).
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Starting in the 1860s, ticket stores further became involved in government businesses
through the delivery of part of the government revenue. In accordance with the Qing
Dynasty’s ordinances, certain provinces had to submit part of their tax revenues directly to
China’s capital, Beijing. This practice was known as jingxiang in China. Taking advantage
of their close relationships with government officials, ticket stores gradually became the
government’s main financial agencies in collecting and remitting taxes, advancing
jingxiang payments on behalf of local authorities, and issuing notes (Cheng, 2003).
Corporate governance attributes. The ticket stores dominated China’s domestic
remittances before the introduction of modern banking. At its height in the late 1890s, the
total paid-up capital of all ticket stores had reached C$42 million[2]. However, only the high
leverage made ticket stores highly profitable. All ticket stores were organized as single
proprietorships or partnerships. With unlimited liability, most owners contributed
additional working capital in the form of deposit as “protective capital” (huben) to keep the
fast growth[3]. By the 1890s, the total capital power of ticket stores was estimated at
C$280 million, which included C$42 million in paid-up capital, C$210 million in deposits
(including the owners’ “protecting capital”), and C$28 million in notes issued (Cheng, 2003).
The Shanxi bankers developed a different governance structure from Chinese
traditional family companies. The ticket store was actually operated by professional,
non-family managers. Even owners have unlimited liability, they cannot interfere in
daily business. Some stores even had an explicit exclusion clause on prohibiting the
hiring of their owners’ relatives for staff positions (Zhang et al., 2006). This governance
structure was perhaps China’s first attempt to separate ownership and control,
although interestingly such separation did not lead to the birth of modern corporate
governance structure.
To solve the agency problem, ticket stores developed distinct reward structures.
Managers and staffs have “human shares” (shenggu) in the company, which is closed to
modern stock option design to align the interests of managers with the long-term interest
of their owners. Basically, the owner and the employees would collect their dividends in
a four-year period. Combined with their long-term tenures, this arrangement made ticket
store managers focus more on long-term performance and long-term relationships with
clients (Zhang, 1998).
This surprisingly “modern” system was implemented in conjunction with a very
traditional and “closed” apprentice system: all hiring was restricted to local natives
only with careful background checks and reliable third parties guarantors. This
apprentice system and restricted hiring practice kept the tacit knowledge in silver
transactions as business secrets. All Shanxi bankers would deny the job offer to the
staff with any fraudulent and corrupt behavior (Ma, 2004).
At the same time, the ownership of the ticket store was very closed. Even managers
cannot invest their money into the store’s ownership. Most ticket store owners used their
store’s brands as family credits and preferred not to be intervened by the joining of other
investors. One example was that when a famous ticket store manager found out that the
owner did not agree to increase the manager’s proportion in the ownership, he decided to
leave and build his own ticket store with some outsider investors (Zhang, 1998).
Money shops
Original, operation, and organization. Different from the ticket stores’ large-scale of
branches, money shops (qianzhuang) were small native banks, originally from

Zhejiang and Jiangsu Provinces, particularly in the commercial cities, like Shanghai,
Ningbo, and Shaoxing. In the beginning of last Ming Dynasty, the main business of
these native banks was simply money exchanges, most of them emerging from other
industries. For example, the first banker in Shanghai came from the carbon stack
business; the first banker in Ningbo, Fangqi, was a shoemaker, and the first banker in
Nanjing offered lottery tickets. Many money shops in Shanghai and Nanchang also
operated in the rice trade, known as “money and rice store”.
From the beginning, money shops had their localized roots different from the
nationwide network of ticket stores. Ticket stores focused on inter-provincial remittances
and conducted government services, taking senior officials and traders as their main
customers. In contrast, money shops rarely had nationwide branches servicing
cross-provincial trading. It was not until late in the nineteenth century that several
large money shops in South China, like Fukang, started inter-provincial exchange and set
up new branches in other cities. The main business of the money shop was issuing
Bandar’s notes (zhuangpiao) and exchanging bills/notes. The Bandar’s note usually had
an outstanding credit in circulation the same as cash, recognized by both Chinese and
foreign trader (Cheng, 2003). The money shop recorded the amount of money in deposit
receipts, but did not record the name of the depositor. So such non-identified Bandar’s
notes could be circulated in the market. Later Bandar’s notes were printed in the fixed
form, and bankers could add the amount and add a stamp seal on them. The money shop’s
target customers were local business owners. In case of emergencies, customers could even
knock at the door of the money shop for cash at midnight. Money shops performed a good
service for their community and dominated local financial businesses in various areas
before foreign banks made a big entry into China.
The geographic distributions of ticket stores and money shops were also different.
The ticket stores owned major businesses in the Yellow River Valley, and money shops
concentrated in the South Yangtze delta area. These two banks often cooperated with
each other. Sometimes the ticket stores deposited their own idle cash in local money
shops, and sometimes the money shops lent cash to the ticket stores to satisfy the
demand of long-distance traders.
Different from the ticket stores that relied on government’s remittance business,
money shops, particularly those in Shanghai, expanded exponentially during China’s
opening to the world. The total number of money shops was 343 in 1872, which
increased to 440 in 1882 and reached 579 in 1892. In the next two decades, money shops
continued to sustain a dramatic growth, and the total number more than doubled to
1,189 in 1902 and reached 3,239 in 1910 (Zhang, 1998).
Money shops had a close relationship with the local business community. When
foreign banks first entered China in the late 1860s, they relied on the money shops and
compradors to reach local businessmen. The money shops issued Bandar’s notes to the
foreign banks, and received “chop loans” (caipiao). By 1888, all of Shanghai’s 62 large
money shops were receiving chop loans from foreign banks, totaling several million
taels of silver (Cheng, 2003).
To gain more profit from the credits which the money shops got from ticket stores
and foreign banks, the money shops liked to make loan several times their capital.
A money shop with capital of only 20,000 taels of silver often made loans totaling a
million taels. The loan supplied from the money shops played a critical role in linkage
of Chinese merchants and foreigner traders.
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Corporate governance attributes. Different from the centralized administration
structure of the ticket store, the money shop had a smaller scale and decentralized
structure. This flexibility promoted the growth of the money shop population. The
number of money shops surged to around 10,000 in early 1893 with an estimated
C$303 million in total capital, a little more than that of ticket stores (Cheng, 2003).
Among the many factors that prevented ticket stores and money shops from
financing modern industry, the most fatal was their shortage of capital resources.
Despite being larger than those in other parts of China, most of Shanghai’s money
shops had only 20,000 taels of silver in capital before the end of the nineteenth century.
To extend their businesses, money shops in Shanghai and other large treaty ports
increasingly relied on chop loans from foreign banks for their working capital.
Unfortunately, these chop loans were made on a daily basis, and foreign banks had the
right to call them back anytime without notice.
However, money shops had more open ownership than ticket stores. Many of
Shanghai and Zhejiang’s international trading merchants (yanghang) not only saved in
or loaned their money to money shops, but also invested in money shops. Different
from ticket stores, most of the money shop owners were themselves managers and they
preferred to build their relationships through such strategic networks. These flowing
capitals also made it easy for money shop owners to invest in modern banks or
industrial companies. For example, the Rong family is most wealthy in China even
today (Morgan, 2006). The two founders of the family businesses, Rong Zongjing
(1873-1938) and Rong Desheng (1875-1952), both began their business careers as
bankers. With the funds from the money shop, Rong brothers built a business group on
flour and textiles, whose sales accounted for about 20-30 percent of sales in China’s
flour and textile industries.
Money shops also employed many foreign trained students as managers. These
managers had close relationships with international trading merchants. The open
orientation of the money shops’ employment policy stood in sharp contrast to the ticket
stores’ practice that only Shanxi natives could be recruited through a strict apprentice
system.
Organization survival in punctuational change
The demise of ticket stores. The collapse of the Qing Dynasty destroyed the main profit
source of ticket stores: their monopoly over long-distance remittances between the state
and provincial treasuries. Taking advantage of railways, steamships, telegraph, and
other modern communication tools, foreign and modern Chinese banks ultimately took
over the market of long-distance remittances.
Whether or not to adopt new telegraph communication methods and to abandon the
traditional mails report system became a major debate among ticket store managers.
Branch managers in the coastal provinces, who faced intense competition from modern
banks, first realized the challenge and strongly suggested adopting the new technology.
However, general managers in the headquarters located in the hinterland did not realize
the rapid change of the environment and refused to use new communication tools.
Keeping their faith in traditions, the conservative owners of ticket stores also refused to
reform their governance structures. The headquarters in Shanxi rejected many new
opportunities in invest in the modern banks, and even refused the offer from the Board of
Households of the Qing government.

At same time, the ticket stores lost their largest clients, the officers of government,
because of the crash of the Qing Dynasty in 1911. A total of 14 large ticket stores with
their 222 branches were forced to close. Of the 26 ticket stores that survived the 1911
Revolution, 20 went out of business during the 1920s (Cheng, 2003). Although several
ticket stores remained in operation until the 1930s, most ticket stores were bankrupt or
closed by the early 1910s (Figure 5).
Ticket stores were also unable to perform modern banking functions for the Chinese
economy. The branch system they employed dispersed their relatively large capital
base. Furthermore, enjoying their superiority in the business of domestic remittances,
the owners of ticket stores failed to appreciate the potential profitability of the new
opportunities. Extremely conservative owners refused to switch from clients with
whom they were familiar and comfortable, and some even refused to take on new ones.
As a result, until the end of the nineteenth century, ticket stores lost their huge
opportunities in China’s modernizing industrial economy (Zhang et al., 2006).
Between the founding of China Merchant Bank in 1989 till 1911, over 17 government
and private banks had been established. Ticket stores also attempted to re-organize
themselves while the local and foreign banks were eroding their remittance business.
For example, Manager Li Hongling of the Beijing Branch of Pingyao Weifenghou
Ticket Store wrote in his Shanxi Ticket Store Ups and Downs: in 1909, he described the
crisis that ticket stores were facing in the competition from banks, and proposed to
unite all the ticket stores together and set up a San Jin Bank in Shanxi Province in order
to save themselves. Unfortunately, the ticket stores in Shanxi refused the proposal of
reorganizing into an organization of modern banks, resulting in the Chinese banking
industry being dominated by Zhejiang and Jiangsu businesses in later years. In 1921,
only four remaining ticket stores were barely surviving, and only one was transformed
into a money shop later after bankruptcy and reorganization (Zhang, 1998).
The decline and rebirth of money shops. Money shops also suffered a difficult time in
the early Republican era. By the end of 1910, around half of Shanghai’s 100 money
shops were bankrupt with huge loans outstanding. Then the Republican Revolution
broke out and threw half of the remaining money shops out of the financial market. By
February 1912, only 24 remained in business in Shanghai, down from 100 at the end of
1909 (Cheng, 2003).
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However, money shops had deep roots among the local commercial community. Their
close business linkages with local Chinese merchants, particularly Yanghang, continually
supported banking business. The industrialization of the Chinese economy during and
after the First World War also helped the money shops’ survival. Money shops in
Shanghai recovered soon, and reached their apex by the late 1920s. Both the number and
average size of Shanghai’s major money shops increased dramatically during these years.
There were 87 major money shops in Shanghai in 1927, with total paid-up capital of C$18.8
million (Cheng, 2003).
Ticket stores often accumulated much excess funds during their operations and
their loan business was usually conducted through the money shops (Zhang, 1998). It
helped some money shops later evolve into modern banks. According to the Shanghai
Money Shop Archive, nine shareholders invested in money shops and banks at the
same time in 1924. With the development of modern banks, many shareholders either
transferred their money shop shares into banks or began to emulate modern banks’
governance structure and business models. By 1936, more than two-thirds of Shanghai
money shops had extended their business scope to match that of modern banks
(Figures 6 and 7).
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Discussion and conclusion
In the case of the Chinese burgeoning banking industry, we find that money shops,
which were equipped with a decentralized, open, and extended network-based
governance structure, had a higher chance of survival than ticket stores, which were
equipped with a centralized, closed and internalized governance structure and
eventually were able to evolve into modern banks. See Table I for a summary of the key
characteristics of ticket stores vs money shops. This finding of divergence not only
enriches the agency theory on the separation of ownership and control, but also extends
the population ecology’s theory on organizational adaptation to changing technological
and institutional environment. While agency theory treats corporate governance as
a set of contracts to solve the conflicts between the principal and the agent (Fama and
Jensen, 1983; Jensen and Meckling, 1976, 1995), we view corporate governance as a
knowledge distribution system and argue that efficient learning and knowledge
distribution can increase the survival chance under punctuational changes.
A perennial debate has centered on how and why organizations featuring different
governance structures have different performances under different environments.
Taking lessons from the Asian financial crisis in 1997, Li (2003) argues that Asia’s
relation-based governance is inferior to Western rule-based governance. However,
based on research on the organizational evolution of two major Chinese merchant
groups in the eighteenth to twentieth century, Ma (2004) argues that the reliance on
impersonal vis-à-vis personal exchanges and different legal traditions might have
diverging patterns of long-term economic growth between China and the West.
Integrated with theories of punctuational evolution, we argue that when exogenous
shocks – the central mechanisms of evolution – dramatically change the environment,
decentralized, open and extended governance structures can more easily discover new
habitats in which a modified form of organization can thrive. This finding deepens our
Ticket store
Geography
Customer base
Business model
Organizational structure
Hiring and knowledge
distribution
Corporate governance
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Money shop

Originated in inland Shanxi
Province

Originated in commercial cities in
coastal provinces such as Zhejiang,
Jiangsu
Government and inter-provincial
Local Chinese and foreign
traders
merchants
Inter-provincial remittances and
Local money exchange and loans to
governance money transfer services Chinese and foreign merchants
A smaller scale and decentralized
Administered under a centralized
system with head offices in Shanxi structure
and branches across provinces
Hiring restricted to Shanxi natives Employ many foreign trained
students as managers and able to
only through a strict apprentice
system, keep the tacit knowledge as learn the structure of modern banks
business secrets
Organized as single proprietorships Organized as single proprietorships
or partnerships, and closed to the or partnerships, yet open to loans
joining of other investors including and investment from local and
international banks and trading
managers, and refuse to reform
governance structure into modern merchants, eventually matching
modern bank governance
banks

Table I.
A comparison of key
characteristics of ticket
stores and money shops
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understanding on organizational (or species) diversity when nature does make leaps.
It also supports Brown and Eisenhardt’s (1997) argument that in highly competitive
and fast-paced environments, the most successful organizations are not those that
replace their structures – problem solving, decision making, production – with
shifting organic improvisation, but those that are able to combine conditions
supporting openness and experimentation.
Liberalization, deregulation, and advances in information technology have changed
today’s banking industry enormously, just as in the Chinese banking industry 100 years
ago. The worldwide financial system meltdown in 2008 addressed the critical challenge
for corporate governance in today’s banking industry. Treating governance structure as
a defining feature of organizations, we find that efficient knowledge distribution is a key
to the organizational ability to cope with exogenous shocks in the case of the Chinese
burgeoning banking industry. Today’s financial institutions, like AIG and Goldman
Sachs, still can learn the efficient knowledge distribution in risk monitor and governance
structure from the lessons of ticket stores and money shops. While China recently has
been opening up the policy to allow private investment into the banking sector which was
previously dominated by state-owned banks ( Jinghua Times, 2013), new generation bank
managers could learn to access hard/soft information and build incentive policy and
appropriate governance structure from the history of the money shop and the ticket store.
Dewey argued that “all history is necessarily written from the standpoint of the
present” (Dewey, 1938, p. 235). If historians can use contemporary concepts,
methodologies, epistemological assumptions, and modern understanding of words, we
can find new wisdom to understand this turbulent world, discover new solutions to
cope with institutional transition, and pave the road ahead, even though the
competition of different governance structures will never stop in the future.
Notes
1. History of banking in China, available at: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_banking_
in_China
2. C$: the unit of Chinese Qing Dynasty silver coin. The monetary system of Qing Dynasty was
based on silver standard. The purchasing power parity of 1C$ equals to about US$9 today.
3. “Protective capital” is like Tier 2 supplementary capital (beyond Tier 1 core capital) under
today’s Basel Committee on Banking Supervision.
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